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wisdom, we find that wars have not always been
good for the market. 
This article begins by reviewing relevant issues
concerning the links between monetary policy
and asset prices. The following section presents a
monthly time series index of U.S. equity prices
spanning two hundred years and identifies boom
episodes. Subsequent sections present a descriptive
history of U.S. stock market booms since 1834,
summarize our findings, and offer conclusions.
MONETARY POLICY ISSUES
The literature on the linkages between monetary
policy and asset markets is vast. Here, we focus on
two issues—the role of asset prices in the transmis-
sion of monetary policy to the economy as a whole
and the appropriate response of monetary policy
to asset price booms. The first concerns the extent
to which monetary policy might cause an asset price
boom. The second concerns the circumstances in
which monetary policymakers should attempt to
defuse asset price booms.
Asset Prices and the Transmission
Mechanism
There are many views about how monetary
policy might cause an asset price boom. For example,
a traditional view focuses on the response of asset
prices to a change in money supply. In this view,
added liquidity increases the demand for assets,
thereby causing their prices to rise, stimulating the
economy as a whole. A second view, voiced by
Austrian economists in the 1920s and more recently
by economists of the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS), argues that asset price booms are more
likely to arise in an environment of low, stable infla-
tion. In this view, monetary policy can encourage
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arge swings in asset prices and economic
activity in the United States, Japan, and other
countries over the past several years have
brought new attention to the linkages between
monetary policy and asset markets. Monetary policy
has been cited as both a possible cause of asset
price booms and a tool for defusing those booms
before they can cause macroeconomic instability.
Economists and policymakers have focused on
how monetary policy might cause an asset price
boom or turn a boom caused by real phenomena,
such as an increase in aggregate productivity
growth, into a bubble. They have also addressed
how monetary policy authorities should respond
to asset price booms.
This article examines the economic environ-
ments in which past U.S. stock market booms
occurred as a first step toward understanding how
asset price booms come about. Have past booms
reflected real economic growth and advances in
productivity, expansionary monetary policy, infla-
tion, or simply “irrational exuberance” that defies
explanation? We use a simple metric to identify
several episodes of sustained, rapid rises in equity
prices in the 19th and 20th centuries and then assess
both narrative and quantitative information about
the growth of real output, productivity, the price
level, the money supply, and credit during each
episode. Across some two hundred years, we find
that two U.S. stock market booms stand out in terms
of their length and rate of increase in market prices—
the booms of 1923-29 and 1994-2000. In general,
we find that booms occurred in periods of rapid
real growth and advances in productivity. We find,
however, no consistent relationship between infla-
tion and stock market booms, though booms have
typically occurred when money and credit growth
were above average. Finally, contrary to conventional
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asset price booms simply by credibly stabilizing
the price level. Still another view, coming from the
dynamic general-equilibrium macroeconomics 
literature, argues that asset price bubbles can result
from the failure of monetary policy to credibly 
stabilize the price level. 
The liquidity view has a long history. Some early
Keynesian IS-LM models, such as that of Metlzer
(1951), had central bank operations affecting stock
prices directly. A next generation of models, variants
of which are presented in Friedman and Schwartz
(1963b), Tobin (1969), and Brunner and Meltzer
(1973), introduce a broader range of assets into the
traditional Keynesian liquidity mechanism. In these
models, central bank operations that increase liquid-
ity will cause the prices of assets that comprise the
private sector’s portfolio, including equities and
real estate, to rise and thereby lower their returns.
Substitution from more- to less-liquid assets occurs
as the returns on the former decline relative to the
latter. The impact of expansionary monetary policy
will be apparent first in the price of short-term
government securities; then longer-term securities;
then other assets such as stocks, real estate, and
commodities such as gold; and finally in the overall
price level. Thus, this view sees rising asset prices
as a possible harbinger of future inflation. 
The Austrian-BIS view argues that an asset
price boom, whatever its fundamental cause, can
degenerate into a bubble if monetary policy passively
allows bank credit to expand to fuel the boom. This
view holds that, unless policymakers act to defuse
a boom, a crash will inevitably follow that in turn
may cause a downturn in economic activity. The
Austrians tended to equate rising asset prices with
general price inflation. For example, although the
level of U.S. consumer prices was virtually unchanged
between 1923 and 1929, the Austrians viewed the
period as one of rapid inflation fueled by loose
Federal Reserve policy and excessive growth of
bank credit (e.g., Rothbard, 1983).1
This view has carried forward into the modern
discussion of asset price booms. Two issues are rel-
evant. The first is whether the price index targeted
by the central bank should include asset prices.
Alchian and Klein (1973) contend that a theoretically
correct measure of inflation is the change in the
price of a given level of utility, which includes the
present value of future consumption. An accurate
estimate of inflation, they argue, requires a broader
price index than one consisting of only the prices
of current consumption goods and services. To cap-
ture the price of future consumption, Alchian and
Klein (1973) contend that monetary authorities
should target a price index that includes asset prices.
Bryan, Cecchetti, and O’Sullivan (2002) concur,
arguing that because it omits asset prices (especially
housing prices), the consumer price index (CPI)
seriously understated inflation during the 1990s.2
A second connection of the Austrian view to the
recent experience concerns the issue of “financial
imbalances,” which Borio and Lowe (2002) define
as rapid growth of credit in conjunction with rapid
increases in asset prices and, possibly, investment.3
Borio and Lowe (2002) argue that a buildup of such
imbalances can increase the risk of a financial crisis
and macroeconomic instability. They construct an
index of imbalances based on a credit gap (devia-
tions of credit growth from trend), an equity price
gap, and an output gap to identify incipient asset
price declines that lead to significant real output
losses, and they advocate its use as a guide for pro-
active policy action. Eichengreen and Mitchener
(2003) find that a similar index for the 1920s helps
explain the severity of the Great Depression.
Borio and Lowe (2002) argue that low inflation
can promote financial imbalances, regardless of
the underlying cause of an asset price boom. For
example, by generating optimism about the macro-
economic environment, low inflation might cause
asset prices to rise more in response to an increase
in productivity growth than they otherwise would.
Similarly, an increase in demand is more likely to
cause asset prices to rise if the central bank is viewed
as credibly committed to price stability. A commit-
ment to price stability that is viewed as credible,
Borio and Lowe (2002) argue, will make product
prices less sensitive and output and profits more
sensitive in the short run to an increase in demand.
At the same time, the absence of inflation may cause
monetary policymakers to delay tightening policy
as demand pressures build. Thus, Borio and Lowe
2 See also Goodhart and Hofmann (2000). Filardo (2000), by contrast,
concludes that including housing prices in an index of inflation would
not substantially improve U.S. economic performance.
3 See also Borio, English, and Filardo (2003) and Borio and White (2003).
See Laidler (2003) and Eichengreen and Michener (2003) for discussion
of the similarities and differences between the modern “imbalance”
view and the Austrian emphasis on bank credit induced “forced saving”
as the cause of “overinvestment” in the 1920s that led to the stock
market crash and the Great Depression.
1 See Laidler (2003) and the references therein for more on the Austrian
view.
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(2002, pp. 30-31) contend that “these endogenous
responses to credible monetary policy [can] increase
the probability that the latent inflation pressures
manifest themselves in the development of imbal-
ances in the financial system, rather than immediate
upward pressure in higher goods and services price
inflation.”
The possibility that monetary policy can produce
asset price bubbles has also been studied extensively
in equilibrium rational-expectations models. In such
models, poorly designed monetary policies, such
as the use of interest rate rules without commitment
to a steady long-run inflation rate, can lead to self-
fulfilling prophesies and asset price bubbles. Such
outcomes are less likely, Woodford (2003) argues, if
monetary policymakers follow a clear rule in which
the interest rate target is adjusted sufficiently to
stabilize inflation. The theoretical literature thus
suggests that consideration of the monetary policy
environment may be crucial to understanding why
asset booms come about.
Proactive Policy in Response to Asset
Price Booms?
The appropriate response, if any, of monetary
policy to an asset price boom was the subject of
extensive debate during the U.S. stock market boom
of 1994-2000 and the recession that followed. Since
periods of explosive growth in asset prices have
often preceded financial crises and contractions in
economic activity, some economists argue that by
defusing asset price booms, monetary policy can
limit the adverse impact of financial instability on
economic activity. The likelihood of a price collapse
and subsequent macroeconomic decline might, how-
ever, depend on why asset prices are rising in the
first place. Many analysts believe that asset booms
do not pose a threat to economic activity or the
outlook for inflation so long as they can be justified
by realistic prospects of future earnings growth.
On the other hand, if rising stock prices reflect
“irrational exuberance,” they may pose a threat to
economic stability and, in the minds of many, justify
a monetary policy response to encourage market
participants to revalue equities more realistically.
The traditional view holds that monetary policy
should react to asset price movements only to the
extent that they provide information about future
inflation. This view holds that monetary policy will
contribute to financial stability by maintaining stabil-
ity of the price level (Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock,
2002, 2003; Schwartz, 1995), and that financial
imbalances or crises should be dealt with separately
by regulatory or lender-of-last-resort policies
(Schwartz, 2002).4
Many economists do not accept the traditional
view, at least not entirely. Smets (1997), for example,
argues that monetary policy tightening is optimal
in response to “irrational exuberance” in financial
markets (see also Detken and Smets, 2003). Simi-
larly, Cecchetti et al. (2000) contend that monetary
policy should react when asset prices become mis-
aligned with fundamentals. Bernanke and Gertler
(2001) express doubt that policymakers can judge
reliably whether asset prices are being driven by
“irrational exuberance” or that an asset price col-
lapse is imminent. Cecchetti (2003) replies, however,
that asset price misalignments are no more difficult
to identify than other components of the Taylor rule,
such as potential output. 
Bordo and Jeanne (2002a,b) offer a novel argu-
ment in support of a monetary policy response to
asset price booms. They argue that preemptive
actions to defuse an asset price boom can be
regarded as insurance against the high cost of lost
output should a bust occur. Bordo and Jeanne con-
tend that policymakers should attempt to contain
asset price misalignments when the risk of a bust
(or the consequences of a bust) is large or when
the cost of defusing a boom is low in terms of fore-
gone output. Bordo and Jeanne show that a tension
exists between these two conditions. As investors
become more exuberant, the risk associated with a
reversal in market sentiment increases, but leaning
against the wind of investor optimism requires more
costly monetary actions. Thus, the monetary author-
ities must evaluate both the probability of a costly
crisis and the extent to which they can reduce this
probability.
FOMC Deliberations About the Stock
Market
The debate about the appropriate response of
monetary policy to asset price booms has not taken
place solely in professional journals and working
papers. The implications of rising asset prices
became an increasingly important component of
Federal Reserve policy discussions during the U.S.
4 Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) present the traditional view in the
context of a Taylor rule. Bullard and Schaling (2002), Schinasi and
Hargraves (1993), and White (2004) are among other studies support-
ing the traditional view.
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stock market boom of 1994-2000. Cecchetti (2003)
presents evidence suggesting that movements in
equity prices help explain adjustments in the Federal
Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) federal funds
rate target during this period.5
Transcripts of FOMC meetings in 1996 and 1997
reveal that Fed officials focused on a potential
“wealth effect” of rising stock prices on consumer
confidence and spending and worried that a sudden
reversal of equity prices could cause real economic
activity to decline sharply. For example, at a meeting
on March 26, 1996, Chairman Greenspan stated
that “It’s hard to believe that if any series of adverse
developments were to occur, the market would not
come down rather substantially and reverse the
wealth effect. That probably would dampen econ-
omic activity quite substantially” (FOMC transcript,
March 26, 1996, p. 29).
Policymakers grew increasingly concerned as
equity prices continued to rise, and the FOMC dis-
cussed how to respond. At a Committee meeting
on February 4-5, 1997, Chairman Greenspan stated
that the prevailing level of equity prices, along with
unusually narrow interest rate credit spreads, “sug-
gest[s] that product prices alone should not be the
sole criterion [for conducting monetary policy] if
we are going to maintain a stable, viable financial
system whose fundamental goal…is the attainment
of maximum sustainable economic growth” (FOMC
transcript, February 4-5, 1997, p. 103).
Greenspan saw a conundrum in the use of mone-
tary policy to defuse an asset price boom, however,
and expressed the view that stock market booms
are more likely to occur when inflation is low: 
We have very great difficulty in monetary
policy when we confront stock market bub-
bles. That is because, to the extent that we
are successful in keeping product price infla-
tion down, history tells us that price-earnings
ratios under those conditions go through the
roof. What is really needed to keep stock
market bubbles from occurring is a lot of
product price inflation, which historically
has tended to undercut stock markets almost
everywhere. There is a clear tradeoff. If
monetary policy succeeds in one, it fails in
the other. Now, unless we have the capability
of playing in between and managing to know
exactly when to push a little here and to pull
a little there, it is not obvious to me that there
is a simple set of monetary policy solutions
that deflate the bubble. (FOMC transcript,
September 24, 1996, pp. 30-31) 
We next turn to the history of past U.S. stock
market booms to try to identify the macroeconomic
environments in which booms have occurred as a
first step toward identifying lessons for the conduct
of monetary policy in these cases.
Historical Data on the U.S. Stock
Market
We focus on the stock market because long-term
data on the prices of other assets, e.g., real estate,
are not available and, moreover, because stock prices
are often the focus of policy concerns about the
causes and effects of booms and busts (e.g., during
the late 1990s and the 1920s).6 Our interest is with
the performance of broad stock market averages,
not in the performance of individual stocks or groups
of stocks. Booms, of course, are typically centered
in particular sectors—usually the “high-tech” sectors
of the day—but the booms that capture the attention
of macroeconomists and policymakers are broadly
based. In the 1990s, computer, telecommunications,
and internet stocks were at the epicenter of the stock
market boom. The stock prices of a wide range of
companies also rose sharply, however, and the
broader market averages, such as the Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) 500 and the Wilshire 5000, all increased
substantially, though not as much as the NASDAQ,
which quintupled (see Figure 1 for comparison of
the S&P 500 and NASDAQ from 1990 to 2003).
Schwert (1990) constructed a continuous
monthly stock market index for the United States
for the period 1802-70, linking indices created by
Smith and Cole (1935) for 1802-62 and Macaulay
(1938) for 1863-70. Banks were the first large cor-
porate enterprises in the United States, and for
1802-34, the stock market index consists of only
bank stocks. Railroads, the largest corporate sector
throughout much of the 19th century, got their start
in the 1830s. For 1835-45, the stock market index
comprises both bank and railroad stock prices, and
for 1846-70 only railroad stocks. 
6 Helbling and Terrones (2004) examine both housing and stock market
booms for several countries since 1970.
5 Additional evidence of a monetary policy response to the stock market
is presented by Rigobon and Sack (2003). Hayford and Malliaris
(2004), by contrast, find that the Fed did not respond to the market.
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After the Civil War, the U.S. industrial sector
grew to include large publicly traded manufacturers
of steel, petroleum products, chemicals, and other
goods, and available indices of stock prices reflect
the increasing breadth of the market. We link
Schwert’s (1990) index for 1802-70 to the Cowles
(1939) index of New York Stock Exchange prices
covering 1871-1920 and then to the S&P composite
index. A consistent S&P series is available from 1921
to the present modern form, the S&P 500 index.7
Figure 2 plots the entire index, from 1802 to 2002.8
Identifying Booms
Our objective is to describe the macroeconomic
environments in which sustained, rapid rises in
stock prices have occurred. Over our entire sample,
two boom episodes stand out, both in terms of their
length and rate of advance in the market index: the
bull markets of 1923-29 and 1994-2000. The rate
of advance in the market index has been faster at
other times, but only for short periods. Similarly,
there have been other long bull markets, but none
with such a large average rate of increase in the
market index. Since the bull market of the 1920s
stands out, we examine both the macroeconomic
environment in which that boom occurred and the
debate it generated among monetary policymakers.
We also examine other episodes of rapid, sustained
increases in the stock market index, however, in our
attempt to identify environmental characteristics
of stock market booms in general.
U.S. Stock Market Booms: Alternative Starting Dates
Avg. % change Beginning  Avg. % change Beginning Avg. % change
Boom in index when in index when in index Boom
beginning during boom local peak during boom global peak during boom ending
in trough (months duration) surpassed (months duration) surpassed (months duration) month
Feb 1834 35.06 (16)  Apr 1834 26.45 (14) Apr 1834 26.45 (14) May 1835
Jan 1843 23.35 (36) Dec 1843 12.31 (25) Dec 1852 NA Dec 1845
Nov 1848 9.80 (50) May 1852 20.05 (7) Dec 1852 NA Dec 1852
Jul 1861 40.20 (33) Oct 1862 37.28 (20) May 1863 27.24 (10) Mar 1864
Apr 1867 8.83 (61) Jan 1868 7.05 (52)  Jan 1868 7.05 (52) Apr 1872
Jun 1877 22.58 (49) Oct 1879 21.13 (21) Apr 1880 21.22 (15)  Jun 1881
Aug 1896 20.74 (33)  Sep 1896 19.47 (32)  Dec 1900 NA Apr 1899
Sep 1900 22.02 (25)  Nov 1900 17.76 (23)  Dec 1900 15.34 (22)  Sep 1902
Oct 1903 16.74 (36)  Mar 1905 12.82 (19)  Mar 1905 12.82 (19)  Sep 1906
Aug 1896 10.33 (122) Sep 1896 9.92 (121) Dec 1900 7.32 (70) Sep 1906
Oct 1923 23.70 (72) Nov 1924 25.12 (59) Jan 1925 23.97 (45) Sep 1929
Mar 1935 41.32 (24) Aug 1935 30.28 (19) Sep 1954 NA Feb 1937
Apr 1942 21.92 (50) Dec 1944 25.78 (18) Sep 1954 NA May 1946
Jun 1949 18.08 (44) Jan 1950 15.17 (37) Sep 1954 NA Jan 1953
Sep 1953 26.87 (35) Mar 1954 26.88 (29) Sep 1954 24.85 (23) Jul 1956
Jun 1949 18.27 (86) Jan 1950 16.95 (79) Sep 1954 24.85 (23) Jul 1956
Jun 1962 14.79 (44) Sep 1963 10.84 (29) Sep 1963 10.84 (29) Jan 1966
Jul 1984 26.04 (38) Jan 1985 25.96 (32) Jan 1985 25.96 (32) Aug 1987
Dec 1987 11.57 (74) Jul 1989 8.34 (55) Jul 1989 8.34 (55) Jan 1994
Apr 1994 19.64 (77) Feb 1995 21.23 (67) Feb 1995 21.23 (67) Aug 2000
Table 1
7 Data for 1871-1920 are from the National Bureau of Economic
Research macro-history database (series m11025a), and those for
1921-2002 are from Haver Analytics. Alternative indices are available,
e.g., the Dow Jones Industrial Average, which began in 1895, but the
episodes of “boom” and “bust” that appear in one index are common
to all of the alternative broad indices.
8 The New York Stock Exchange was closed during August-November
1914 and, hence, there are no index values for those months.
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There is, of course, no precise empirical defini-
tion of an asset price boom, and researchers have
imposed a number of filters to identify specific
episodes that they then define as booms. We begin
by using the methodology of Pagan and Sossounov
(2003) to identify sustained periods of rising stock
prices. Beginning in 1834, we identify the peak and
the trough months for the market within a rolling
25-month window.9 We require that peaks and
troughs alternate, and so we eliminate all but the
highest (lowest) of peaks (troughs) that occur before
a subsequent trough (peak). Finally, we identify
booms as periods lasting at least three years from
trough to peak. Table 1 lists all such booms in our
data, plus a few shorter episodes of exceptional
increase in the market index, such as February
1834–May 1835. The table also lists a few periods
that include two or more consecutive booms that
were interrupted by short market declines and that
might be better thought of as a single episode. For
each period, the table also lists the average, annual-
ized increase in the index during the boom period,
i.e., from the month following the trough to the peak
month.
One might question whether stock market
booms should be defined to include recoveries
from prior stock market declines. Indeed, some of
the booms listed in Table 1 include long periods in
which the market average remained below a prior
peak. Hence, for each boom, we also indicate the
month in which the previous (local) peak was
reached, as well as the month in which the previous
all-time market (global) peak was reached.10 For
each episode, we report the average, annualized
increase in the index from the month following the
attainment of both the prior local and global peaks
to the new peak month. Clearly, a few sustained
booms, such as that of July 1861–March 1864,
involved several months in which the market was
merely recovering to a prior peak (or to the prior
all-time high). Indeed, a few booms ended without
reaching a prior global peak. In general, the average
increase in the market index was larger during the
recovery phase of booms than during the phase in
which the market index exceeded its prior high.
Interestingly, two exceptions are the booms of the
1920s and of the late 1990s, suggesting again that
these two booms were unique in character as well
as magnitude.
Some studies define booms as sustained periods
of increase in an asset price index above a trend
growth rate (e.g., Bordo and Jeanne, 2002a; Detken
and Smets, 2003). Figures 2 through 4 plot values
of our stock price index alongside a nine-year trailing
moving average of the index. From these charts,
episodes when the market average increased (or
decreased) rapidly relative to its recent trend are
evident. Booms are evident in the mid-1830s, during
the Civil War, from about 1879 to 1881, and, with
interruptions, from about 1896 to 1906. The bull
market of the 1920s is clearly evident, as is the rise
from 1994 to 2000. In addition, the market advanced
well above trend in the early 1950s and again from
about 1984 to 1987.
Figure 5 plots the “real” (i.e., inflation-adjusted)
stock market index and nine-year trailing moving
average for 1924-2002. In theory, stock prices should
not be affected by inflation that is anticipated.11
Nevertheless, this plot illustrates more clearly that the
bull markets of the 1920s and 1994-2000 stand out
as exceptional periods of sustained, large increases
in real as well as nominal stock prices. The real
stock market index also rose substantially during
the mid-1950s and between 1984 and 1987. Thus,
regardless of how one looks at the data, the same
boom episodes stand out.
The Economic Environment of Booms
Table 2 reports information about the growth
rates of labor productivity, real gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), industrial production, money stock, bank
credit, and the price level during the boom episodes
identified in Table 1. Here we define the start of a
boom as the month following a market trough. For
comparison, we also report growth rates of these
variables over longer periods. Unfortunately, few
macroeconomic data exist for early boom periods,
and what data there are usually consist of annual
9 We begin with 1834 because the stock market index before that year
comprised only a small number of bank stocks, and, as shown in
Figure 2, there appear to have been no large movements in the index
before then.
10 Helbling and Terrones (2004) use a similar approach in their cross-
country study of stock market and real estate booms since 1970.
11 The traditional capital asset pricing model posits that the current
market price of a stock will equal the present discounted value of the
expected dividend stream to the stockholder. Expected inflation should
not affect the current price of the stock because even though expected
inflation may increase the nominal dividend stream, the relevant
interest rate for discounting those earnings also will reflect the
expected inflation. Unanticipated inflation can, of course, wreak havoc
with an investor’s ex post real return on asset holdings, as occurred
during the 1970s.
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observations. It appears, however, that market booms
generally occurred during periods of relatively rapid
growth of output and productivity. Pre-World War II
booms also tended to occur during periods of above-
average growth in the money stock, bank credit, and,
sometimes, the price level. The growth rates of the
money stock, bank credit, and the price level were
not above average during the boom of 1923-29,
however, nor during most post-World War II booms. 
We next examine specific historical episodes in
more detail. Obviously, not every episode identified
in Table 1 deserves attention. From looking closely
at a few episodes, however, we identify certain
characteristics about the environments in which
booms have occurred.
Antebellum Stock Market Booms
The stock market booms of the 19th century
were closely associated with the development of
the nation’s infrastructure—first canals and steam-
ships, then railroads. 
1834-35. Schwert’s (1990) stock market index
for this period combines indices of bank and rail-
road stocks from Smith and Cole (1935), with more
weight put on the railroad stock index. Smith and
Cole (1935) document a close relationship between
public land sales and railroad stock prices in 1834-
35, though stock prices peaked and began to fall
before land sales started to decline in 1836 (p. 82).
The close correlation between land sales and rail-
road stock prices throughout the antebellum period
led Smith and Cole to conclude that “both series…
may be regarded as reflecting a common element—
that of the well-known speculative spirit of the
country” (p. 82). 
Federal government land sales rose from under
$2 million a year in the 1820s to $5 million in 1834,
$15 million in 1835, and $25 million in 1836. The
land-sales and stock market booms occurred during
a period of commodity price inflation. Temin (1969,
p. 92) argues that the land boom was sparked by a
sharp increase in the price of cotton, which rose
some 50 percent during 1834 alone. The money
stock increased sharply in 1835-36, spurred by large
inflows of Mexican silver, which increased the growth
rate of the monetary base (Temin, 1969, pp. 68-69).12
It appears from limited data that the boom also
occurred during a period of fairly strong growth of
real economic activity. Smith and Cole’s (1935, p. 73)
index of the volume of trade shows a 14 percent
rise in domestic trade in 1834-35 and even larger
percentage gains in exports in 1835-36. Davis’s
12 At the time, the United States was on a bimetallic—gold and silver—
standard. An increase in British investment in U.S. securities, coupled
with a decline in silver exports to China, caused the inflow of Mexican
silver to increase the monetary base.
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The Macroeconomic Environment of U.S. Stock Market Booms
Avg. % change Avg. % change  Avg. % change A
Trough month Peak month stock index productivity money stock
Feb 1834 May 1835 35.06 NA 6.58
Jan 1843 Dec 1845 23.35 NA 16.57
Nov 1848 Dec 1852 9.80 NA 11.65
Jul 1861 Mar 1864 40.20 NA NA
Apr 1867 Apr 1872 8.83 NA 4.00
Jun 1877 Jun 1881 22.58 1.20 11.93
Aug 1896 Apr 1899 20.74 3.44 12.38
Sep 1900 Sep 1902 22.02 2.30 12.10
Oct 1903 Sep 1906 16.74 3.16 8.47
Aug 1896 Sep 1906 10.33 2.57 9.88
Oct 1923 Sep 1929 23.70 2.08 3.93
Mar 1935 Feb 1937 41.32 2.49 10.93
Apr 1942 May 1946 21.92 1.90 17.91
Jun 1949 Jan 1953 18.08 3.86 3.75
Sep 1953 Jul 1956  26.87 1.69 2.85
Jun 1949 Jul 1956 18.27 2.71 3.30
Jun 1962 Jan 1966 14.79 3.68 7.83
Jul 1984 Aug 1987 26.04 1.54 7.37
Dec 1987 Jan 1994 11.57 1.62 3.43
Apr 1994 Aug 2000 19.64 1.98 5.13
Comparison periods
Jan 1834 Dec 1859 –0.62 NA 5.93
Jan 1866 Dec 1913 2.31 1.30† 5.71‡
Jan 1919 Dec 1940 3.99 2.05 3.29
Jan 1946 Dec 2002 7.67 2.21§ 6.09
Table 2
NOTE: *Crashes and wars that occurred immediately prior to, during, or immediately after a boom. 20th century crashes are docu-
mented by Mishkin and White (2002). † Average for 1875-1913; ‡ average for 1867-1913; § average for 1949-2002; ¶ average for 1947-2002.
DEFINITIONS and SOURCES:
Percentage changes (%∆) are computed as annualized percentage changes in monthly data, i.e., %∆t = 1200[(xt/xt – 1) – 1] (similar
formulas are used for quarterly or annual data). The figures reported in the table are averages of these percentage changes from the
month (quarter or year) following the trough month to the peak month, except as noted below.
Productivity: For 1879-1946, labor productivity data are from Gordon (2000b). The data are annual; we report the average annual
percentage change in productivity from the year after the year in which the trough occurs to the year in which the peak occurs. For
1947-2002, data for non-farm business sector labor productivity (output/hour, seasonally adjusted, 1992=100) are from the Commerce
Department. The data are quarterly; we report average annualized growth rates from the quarter following the trough to the quarter
of the peak, unless the peak occurred in the first month of a quarter, in which case our averages are based on data through the previous
quarter.
Money stock: For 1834-1906, data are annual, and we report the average annual percent change in the money stock from the trough
year to the peak year. For 1907-2002, data are monthly, and we report the average annualized percent change from the month following
the trough to the peak month. The data for 1834-59 are the broad money stock series in Friedman and Schwartz (1970). For 1860-62,
we use estimates provided by Hugh Rockhoff. Data for 1863-66 are not available. The data for 1867-1946 are the broad money stock 
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Avg. % change  Avg. % change  Avg. % change  Avg. % change 
bank credit price level industrial production real GDP Crashes and wars*
13.33 13.26 11.91 NA Crash, May 1835
7.29 7.83 11.13 NA
5.25 6.75 7.45 NA
–2.24 25.80 9.68 NA Civil War
5.26 –3.54 5.93 NA
3.20 –1.22 12.76 8.40 Crash, 1880
10.29 4.58 11.48 6.76 Crash, summer 1896
11.64 2.33 10.04 6.58 Crash, 1900
7.82 1.79 12.68 7.03 Crash, Jul-Oct 1903; 1907
9.41 3.27 8.98 5.90
5.02 0.02 10.95 4.33 Crash, Oct 1929
5.78 1.51 19.49 10.63 Crash, Oct 1937–March 1938
21.42 3.42 –1.01 1.67 World War II; crash, Sep 1946
5.17 3.01 10.08 6.60
3.51 0.53 2.09 2.84
4.63 1.89 6.00 4.70
8.47 1.53 7.77 5.61 Crash, Apr-Jun 1962
9.29 3.04 2.41 3.38 Crash, Oct 1987
5.50 3.88 1.71 2.34 Crash, Aug-Oct 1990
7.43 2.53 5.06 3.76 Crash, Aug 2000–Sep 2001
4.00 0.51 6.93 NA
6.64 –1.06 5.41 4.02†
1.81 –0.67 12.73 2.29
7.24 4.05 3.62 3.37¶
DEFINITIONS and SOURCES cont’d:
series in Friedman and Schwartz (1963a). The data for 1947-58 are a broad money stock series from the National Bureau of Economic
Research Macro-History Database (series m14195b). For 1960-2002, we use the M2 money stock (seasonally adjusted) from the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Bank credit: For 1834-1946, data are annual (June figures), and we report the average annual percent change in total bank credit from
the trough year to the peak year from Historical Statistics of the United States (1976, series X580). Data prior to 1896 are incomplete. For
1947-2002, data are monthly from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Price level: For 1834-1912, monthly wholesale price index data (Warren-Pearson and Bureau of Labor Statistics) are from Cole (1938)
and the National Bureau of Economic Research Macro-History database (series m04048a/b). For 1913-2002, we use CPI-U (all items,
seasonally adjusted).
Industrial Production: For 1834-95, data are from Davis (2002). Davis’s data are annual; we report the average annual growth rate from
the year following the trough (except that for the boom beginning in January 1843, we include 1843) through the peak year. For 1896-
1940, (monthly) data are from Miron and Romer (1989). For 1941-2002, we use the Federal Reserve monthly Index of Industrial
Production (seasonally adjusted).
GDP: For 1879-1946, (quarterly) data are from Balke and Gordon (1986). For 1949-2002, we use real GDP (chained $1996) (quarterly
data). We report the average annual growth rate from the quarter following the trough to the peak quarter.
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(2002) index of industrial production shows an
increase of about 12 percent between 1834 and
1835 (Table 2). Hence, the boom episode coincided
with both a general price inflation and rapid real
economic growth. 
The boom was short-lived. Stock prices peaked
in May 1835, and land sales peaked in the first six
months of 1836. Monetary policy actions appear to
explain the end of the boom and a subsequent bank-
ing panic in 1837. Acting under the Deposit Act of
June 1836, the Secretary of the Treasury ordered a
redistribution of public balances from New York
City banks to banks in other states. Subsequently,
President Andrew Jackson issued an executive order,
known as the Specie Circular, mandating the use of
specie (gold and silver) rather than bank notes in
the purchase of federal land. In the absence of a
well-functioning interregional reserves market, the
ensuing outflow of reserves left the New York money
market vulnerable to shocks and, according to
Rousseau (2002), precipitated the Panic of 1837.13
Limited data make it impossible to determine
whether the stock market and land booms of the
1830s were justified by reasonable expectations of
profit growth. The success of New York’s Erie Canal,
which was completed in 1825, brought heavy invest-
ment in other canal projects. Railroad building took
off about the same time. The prospect of greatly
reduced transportation costs, combined with rising
export prices (chiefly cotton), were real phenomena
that could cause equity prices and public land sales
to increase. Nevertheless, monetary shocks, and
perhaps a dose of irrational exuberance, may have
also contributed to the boom, and the end of the
boom was caused by monetary policy actions.
The 1840s. The stock market recovered quickly
from a trough in 1843. Much of the 1843-45 boom
was a recovery to a prior (local) peak (see Table 1).
Smith and Cole (1935, p. 136) attribute the recovery
to “cheap money” and rapid expansion of econ-
omic activity, with capital inflows from abroad
sustaining the boom (p. 111). As in the 1830s, the
stock market boom coincided with a sharp increase
in public land sales. The period also was marked
by rapid growth of the money stock, price level, and
industrial production (see Table 2). 
After a pause in the mid-1840s, stock prices
increased sharply in 1847 but fell back quickly
during the Panic of 1847. Stock prices began to rise
again in 1848 and rose at about a 10 percent annual
rate through 1852. As during the prior boom, the
period 1848-52 was characterized by above average
growth of the money stock, price level, and indus-
trial production. Thus, all three of the antebellum
stock market booms we identify occurred during
periods of rapid growth of the money stock and
price level as well as strong economic activity. 
The Civil War Boom
Equity prices rose sharply from July 1861 to
March 1864, though the real, inflation-adjusted
returns to investors were more modest. The stock
price index rose at an average annual rate of 40.2
percent during the boom, whereas the price level
rose at an average annual rate of 25.8 percent
(Table 2). Adjusted for inflation, the market peak
occurred in October 1863, and the real stock price
index declined precipitously until early 1865, as
shown in Figure 6. 
It was once thought that the Civil War had
encouraged the development of manufacturing
and thereby increased the subsequent growth rate
of the U.S. economy. Industrial production rose fairly
rapidly during the war (see Table 2). Estimates of
the economic cost of the Civil War and its impact
on growth indicate, however, that although specific
firms and industries experienced high profits during
the war, the economy as a whole suffered and the
war did not increase growth (Goldin and Lewis,
1975). Recent studies have related break points in
various asset-price time series to war news, with
major Union victories producing increases in asset
prices (e.g., McCandless, 1996). 
From the Civil War to World War I
The United States experienced a great industrial
expansion during the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, with many new corporations formed and
listed on the stock exchanges. Our stock market
index shows a sustained, though not especially rapid,
rise from April 1867 to April 1872, a more rapid
rise from June 1877 to June 1881, and a long rise
(with two significant interruptions) from August
1896 to September 1906. 
The U.S. price level declined almost continuously
from 1866 to 1896, with the cost of living falling at
an average annual rate of 2 percent (David and Solar,
1977). Figure 7A plots our stock market index along-
side a commodity price index for 1866-1913. Like
13 Temin (1969), by contrast, argues that the U.S. money market tightened
when the Bank of England raised its discount rate (i.e., bank rate) to
discourage capital outflows from the United Kingdom.
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the cost of living, commodity prices fell almost
continuously until 1896, except from mid-1879 to
mid-1882, when commodity prices rose at an aver-
age annual rate of 9 percent. At the ends of the stock
market booms of 1867-72 and 1877-81, the level
of commodity prices was below where it had been
at the start of each boom.
By contrast, the price level rose during the
booms of 1896-1906. Commodity prices rose at a
fairly rapid 4.58 percent annual rate during the 1896-
99 boom and again rose during the subsequent
booms of 1900-02 and 1903-06 (see Table 2). Hence,
the evidence from the post-Civil War era indicates
that stock market booms can occur during periods
of inflation, deflation, and a fairly stable price level.
Figure 7B plots end-of-quarter values of the
stock market index alongside Balke-Gordon’s (1986)
quarterly estimates of real gross national product
(GNP) from 1875 to 1913.14 Real output growth
accelerated in 1879, after several years of modest
growth following a cycle peak in October 1873, and
achieved an astounding 8.4 percent average rate
during the boom of 1877-81 (see Table 2). The growth
rates of the stock price index and of both real GNP
and industrial production were closely correlated
during 1890-1913 (see Table 2). Hence, as in the ante-
bellum era, our evidence indicates that late 19th
century stock market booms occurred during periods
of unusually rapid growth in real economic activity.
Linking stock market booms to productivity
growth during this era is more difficult because
productivity data are limited. Figure 7C plots annual
estimates of labor productivity growth from 1875
to 1913 alongside June values of our stock price
index. In 1896, productivity growth appears to have
increased before the stock market did, and the ups
and downs in the market that follow are correlated
positively with changes in productivity growth.15
Next we examine growth of the money and
credit stocks. We plot end-of-quarter values of our
stock market index and a broad money stock meas-
ure (“M2”) for 1875-1913 in Figure 7D (M2 data are
from Balke and Gordon, 1986). Like real output
and commodity prices, M2 grew rapidly during the
course of the 1877-81 stock market boom. M2 also
grew at double-digit rates during the stock market
booms of 1896-99, 1900-02, and 1903-06.
The relationship between the stock market and
bank credit is more difficult to ascertain because
the only comprehensive credit data for this period
are annual. Figure 8A plots total bank credit along-
side June values of the stock market index for 1866-
1913, and Figure 8B plots annual data on the stock
15 The pattern of growth in total factor productivity is similar to that of
labor productivity in this period.















14 Estimates for years before 1875 are not available.
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market loans of New York City national banks along-
side the stock market index for 1880-1913. Whereas
the correlation between the growth of total bank
credit and the stock market index is low, Figure 8B
indicates that stock market loan growth increased
during the booms of 1896-99, 1900-02, and 1903-
06, as well as during the recovery of 1908-09.16
Railroads were the most visible industry in the
economic expansion and stock market between
1867 and 1873. Railroad investment hit a peak in
1871-72, as did stock prices (Fels, 1959, p. 98). The
collapse of Jay Cooke and Company, the principal
financier of the Northern Pacific Railroad, triggered
the financial crisis of 1873. Railroad building was
stagnant until 1876, but began to expand rapidly in
1877, and the stock market revived. Although the
railroads grew faster than any other industry, the
1870s and early 1880s also witnessed rapid growth
in manufacturing, as well as agricultural output
and productivity (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963a,
pp. 35). 
On the monetary side, in 1879 the United
States returned to the gold standard, which had
been suspended during the Civil War. Hence, the
stock market boom occurred in an environment of
strong growth of real economic activity and success-
ful resumption of the international monetary stan-
dard. While there were reasons to be optimistic
about the growth of corporate earnings in this
environment, contemporary accounts, cited by Fels
(1959, pp. 120-25), suggest that risk premiums fell
unjustifiably and investors were swept up in a
“bubble of overoptimism.” 
Similar contemporary and historical accounts
cite “speculative activity” as one reason for rapid
increases in equity prices during subsequent booms.
For example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, p. 153)
write that “The years from 1902 to 1907 were
characterized by industrial growth…by speculative
activity in the stock market, and by a wave of
immigration.”
In summary, we find that the 19th and early
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16 Data on stock market loans are as of call report dates (usually
September) from Bordo, Rappaport, and Schwartz (1992). Although
stock market loans appear to rise and peak before the stock market,
because the data on loans and the stock market index are not for the
same month in each year, we are hesitant to draw any conclusions
about timing.Bordo and Wheelock REVIEW
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20th century booms occurred when growth of real
output and the money stock were high, but we
observe no consistent pattern with respect to the
price level, i.e., booms occurred during periods of
deflation, inflation, and more-or-less stable prices.
Anecdotes suggest that speculation also character-
ized most booms, but a quantitative assessment of
the extent to which the rise in stock prices during
booms exceeded rational pricing based on funda-
mentals is beyond the scope of this article.
20th Century Booms
The period between the Panic of 1907 and the
beginning of the bull market of the 1920s was
characterized by a choppy market. A significant
panic occurred at the start of World War I in 1914,
and the U.S. stock market was closed for four months.
There were no sustained movements in the market
between 1914 and 1923.
1923-29. In terms of duration and amplitude,
the U.S. stock market boom of 1994-2000 has but
one historical rival—the boom of 1923-29. The
market index rose at an annual average rate of
about 20 percent during both six-year booms. Both
periods were also characterized by low and stable
inflation and high average growth of real GNP and
industrial production. Productivity growth also
increased during both the 1920s and 1990s. In the
1920s, however, the increase in productivity growth
occurred in the three years preceding the stock
market boom, and productivity growth slowed
during the boom period. By contrast, in the 1990s,
productivity began to accelerate around 1995, and
rapid productivity growth coincided with the stock
market boom.
Figure 9A plots our stock market index alongside
the CPI for 1915-40. A rapid increase in the price
level during World War I was followed by deflation
in 1920-21. The consumer price level was virtually
unchanged over the remainder of the 1920s. As
illustrated in Figure 9B, real GNP exhibited positive
growth during 1923-29, interrupted by brief reces-
sions in 1923-24 and 1927. GNP growth during the
boom averaged above the historical norm, but not
above the growth rates experienced during prior
booms (see Table 2). Industrial production also grew
rapidly during the 1923-29 boom, shown in Figure
9C, and reached a peak a few months before the
stock market peak in September 1929. Average
growth of industrial production during the boom
was similar to that experienced in late 19th century
booms (Table 2).
Figure 10 plots annual estimates of nonfarm
labor and total factor productivity for the U.S. econ-
omy, from Kendrick (1961), alongside June values
of our stock market index for 1889-1940. Both labor
and total factor productivity grew relatively rapidly
in the early 1920s. Economists have attributed this
growth to the diffusion of technological break-
throughs that had occurred in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, including the internal combustion
engine and inventions that made the industrial use of
electric power practical. Although the stock market
boom of the 1920s did not coincide precisely with
the productivity acceleration, as it did during 1994-
2000, both booms have been associated with techno-
logical breakthroughs that revolutionized production
in numerous existing industries as well as created
entirely new industries. The high-flying stocks of
the 1920s, such as RCA, Aluminum Company of
America, United Aircraft and Transportation Corpor-
ation, and General Motors were direct beneficiaries
of the new general-purpose technologies and were
expected to have high profit potential, not unlike the
“dot-com” stocks that led the boom of the 1990s.17
Whereas technological progress and accelerat-
ing productivity would be expected to generate an
increase in the growth of corporate profits, and
thereby justify an increase in stock prices, the ques-
tion remains whether such “fundamentals” can
explain the entire increase in the market. Contem-
porary observers disagreed about whether the
stock market boom of 1923-29 was justified by real-
istic expectations of future earnings, as do econ-
omists who look back at the episode. Yale economist
Irving Fisher famously defended the level of the
stock market. For example, he argued that the
increase in corporate profits during the first nine
months of 1929 “is eloquent justification of a height-
17 The internal combustion engine and electric motors are often referred
to as general-purpose technologies because of their wide applicability
and potential to increase productivity in many industries. The micro-
processor is also regarded as a general-purpose technology, and the
increase in productivity growth that occurred around 1995 is com-
monly attributed to the widespread application of computer technology.
Greenspan (2000), for example, contends that “When historians look
back at the latter half of the 1990s a decade or two hence, I suspect
that they will conclude we are now living through a pivotal period in
American economic history. New technologies that evolved from the
cumulative innovations of the past half-century have now begun to
bring about dramatic changes in the way goods and services are pro-
duced and in the way they are distributed to final users. Those innova-
tions, exemplified most recently by the multiplying uses of the Internet,
have brought on a flood of startup firms, many of which claim to offer
the chance to revolutionize and dominate large shares of the nation’s
production and distribution system.” See also David (1990), David and
Wright (1999), Gordon (2000a), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2004).
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ened level of common stock prices” (quoted in White,
2004, p. 10). There were naysayers, however, includ-
ing Paul M. Warburg, a leading banker and former
member of the Federal Reserve Board. Warburg
argued in March 1929 that the market reflected
“unrestrained speculation” that, if continued, would
result in a collapse and a “general depression involv-
ing the entire country.”18
In addition to rapid earnings growth, Fisher
(1930) cited improved management methods, a
decline in labor disputes, and high levels of invest-
ment in research and development as reasons why
stocks were not overvalued in 1929. McGrattan
and Prescott (2003) argue that Fisher was correct.
Although the total market value of U.S. corporations
in 1929 exceeded the value of their tangible capital
stock by 30 percent, McGrattan and Prescott (2003)
estimate that the value of intangible corporate assets,
e.g., the value of R&D investment, fully justified
the level of equity prices.
Other researchers have examined the growth
of corporate earnings and dividends during the
1920s, and most conclude that equity prices rose
far higher than could be justified by reasonable
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18 Quoted in Galbraith (1961, p. 77).
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expectations of future dividends. White (2004), who
surveys and extends this literature, concludes that
the increase in stock prices during 1928-29 exceeded
what could be explained by earnings growth, the
earnings payout rate, the level of interest rates, or
changes in the equity premium, all of which are
components of a standard equity pricing model.
Several Federal Reserve officials, Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover, and a number of other
prominent public officials attributed the stock market
boom to loose monetary policy and the rapid growth
of credit. Neither the money stock nor total bank
credit grew at an unusually fast pace during 1923-29
(see Table 2). Brokers’ loans rose rapidly and in line
with stock prices, however, as Figure 11 illustrates.
Federal Reserve officials viewed the growth in loans
to stock brokers and dealers with alarm. Many
adhered to the so-called Real Bills Doctrine, which
focuses on the composition, rather than total quan-
tity, of bank credit. According to this view, banks
should make only short-term commercial and agri-
cultural loans to finance the production of real goods
and services because loans to finance purchases of
financial assets tend to promote speculation, mis-
allocation of economic resources, and inflation.19
Moreover, asset price bubbles inevitably lead to
crashes and depressions, which are required to
“purge the rottenness out of the system,” as U.S.
Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon famously once
said (Hoover, 1952, p. 30).
Federal Reserve officials debated whether their
actions had contributed to the growth of brokers’
loans and financial speculation. Some officials com-
plained that the Fed was fueling the stock market
boom by making discount window loans to banks
that in turn lent to stock brokers and dealers. Although
only short-term commercial and agricultural loans
could be used as collateral for discount window
loans, some Federal Reserve Board members argued
that banks should be forced to liquidate their loans
to stock brokers and dealers before being allowed
to borrow at the discount window with eligible col-
lateral. In February 1929, the Federal Reserve Board
directed the Reserve Banks to ensure that Federal
Reserve credit was not used to finance speculative
activity: “The Board…has a grave responsibility
whenever there is evidence that member banks are
maintaining speculative security loans with the aid
of Federal Reserve credit. When such is the case the
Federal Reserve Bank becomes either a contributing
or a sustaining factor in the current volume of
speculative security credit. This is not in harmony
with the intent of the Federal Reserve Act nor is it
conducive to the wholesome operation of the bank-
ing and credit system of the country.”20
Open market operations constituted a second
channel by which Federal Reserve credit contributed
to the stock market boom, according to critics. Open
market purchases made during economic recessions
in 1924 and 1927 came when “business could not
use, and was not asking for increased money,”
Federal Reserve Board member Adolph Miller
alleged.21 In the absence of increased demand for
Fed credit for “legitimate” business needs, according
to this view, open market purchases increased the
supply of funds available to purchase stocks and
thereby inflated the bubble.
Fed officials were not unanimous in their views.
In general, Federal Reserve Bank officials disagreed
with the idea that it was desirable, or even possible,
to control commercial banks’ use of funds obtained
from the discount window. Reserve Bank officials
tended to argue for discount rate increases, rather
than any form of “direct pressure,” to curtail discount
window borrowing. 
Fed officials also disagreed about the relationship
between open market operations and the stock
market. Disagreement centered on whether the
large open market purchases of 1924 and 1927 had
been desirable or harmful. Benjamin Strong, the
governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
from its inception in 1914, was the Fed’s dominant
figure and head of the System’s Open Market Invest-
ment Committee until his death in 1928. Although
other System officials acquiesced, the open market
purchases of 1924 and 1927 were largely Strong’s
idea.22 When asked by the Senate Banking Com-
19 Contemporaries argued that banks “pushed” loans to purchase stocks
on an unsophisticated public. Rappoport and White (1994) show,
however, that the risk premium on brokers’ loans increased sharply
in the late 1920s, indicating that the growth of brokers’ loan volume
reflected growing demand rather than increasing loan supply.
20 Quoted in Chandler (1971, pp. 56-57).
21 Testifying before the Senate Banking Committee in 1931 (quoted in
Wheelock, 1991, pp. 98-99).
22 Strong’s motives for engaging in open market purchases in 1924 and
1927 have been debated. Meltzer (2002, pp. 197-221) finds that the
actions were undertaken both to encourage domestic economic
recovery from recessions and to assist the Bank of England in attracting
and maintaining gold reserves by lowering U.S. interest rates relative
to those in the United Kingdom. Meltzer concludes, however, that
international cooperation was relatively more important than domestic
recovery in 1927. Wheelock (1991) reports empirical evidence that
both domestic and international goals were important throughout
1924-29.Bordo and Wheelock REVIEW
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mittee in 1931 whether those purchases had been
appropriate, some Federal Reserve Bank officials
argued that they had been useful but perhaps too
large, while other Fed officials contended that no
open market purchases should have been made in
those years. For example, officials of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago argued that the purchases
in 1924 had been too large and “in 1927 the danger
of putting money into the market was greater than
in 1924 as speculation was well under way.” Officials
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond went fur-
ther, arguing that “we think…securities should not
have been purchased in these periods, and the aim
should have been to decrease rather than augment
the total supply of Federal Reserve Credit.”23
Although not reflected in growth of the money
stock or total bank credit, critics charged that the
Fed had pursued a dangerously loose monetary
policy as reflected in the growth of brokers’ loans
and the rise in the stock market.
The 1930s. At its nadir in June 1932, the S&P
stock market index stood at just 15 percent of its
September 1929 peak. The market staged a brief
recovery in 1933, then surged from March 1935 to
February 1937. The boom of 1935-37 coincided
with a period of rapid growth in real output and the
23 These quotes are from Wheelock (1991, p. 100).
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money stock and came in the middle of a decade
of unusually rapid growth in total factor productiv-
ity (Field, 2003). Inflation, however, remained low
(see Table 2). The adoption of highly restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies in 1936-37 snuffed
out the economic recovery and brought a halt to
the stock market boom in early 1937. 
World War II. The next stock market boom
occurred during World War II. U.S. equity prices
declined when the war began in Europe, hitting a
low point in March 1942. The stock market then
rose as the U.S. economy was being mobilized for
war. Similar to the view that the Civil War had a
positive effect on postwar economic growth by
hastening the development of manufacturing
industries, World War II has also been viewed as
an important source of technological progress and
postwar economic growth. Field (2003) shows, how-
ever, that most of the seeds of postwar growth were
sown during the 1930s and that productivity growth
was slow during the war outside the munitions
industries. Thus, the stock market boom probably
reflected more the rapid increases in output and
liquidity during the war as the economy finally
reached full employment than productivity-driven
expectations of a long-run increase in the growth
of corporate profits.
The Post-World War II Era
The nearly 60 years since the end of World War II
can be divided into three distinct eras. The first, from
the end of the war to the early 1970s, was character-
ized by a rising stock market, strong real economic
growth, a high average rate of productivity growth,
and (toward the end of the period) rising inflation.
The second era, covering the 1970s and early 1980s,
was characterized by stagflation—high inflation
coupled with both highly variable and low average
output and productivity growth. Nominal stock
returns were flat, and ex post real returns were nega-
tive. In the third era, from the mid-1980s to the
present, real output growth has been more stable
and, on average, higher than it was before 1980.
Inflation has fallen markedly, and, since the mid-
1990s, productivity growth has returned to the high
average rates observed in the 1950s and early 1960s.
Stock returns have been high, both in nominal and
real terms, especially during the booms of 1984-87
and 1994-2000. Figures 12 (panels A through C) and
13 (panels A and B) illustrate these patterns.
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Technological breakthroughs in chemicals,
electronics, and other industries during the 1930s
and 1940s enabled rapid growth in labor productiv-
ity and living standards during the 1950s and 1960s
(Field, 2003; Gordon, 2000a). These decades also
witnessed high levels of investment in public infra-
structure and education. Our metric identifies three
specific stock market booms in these decades, though
one might characterize the entire period as a boom. 
The first boom began as the economy pulled
out of a mild recession in 1949. The market rose at
an average annual rate of 18 percent between June
1949 and January 1953. Following a pause during
another recession in 1953-54, the market rose at
an average annual rate of nearly 27 percent from
September 1953 to July 1956. Although the growth
rates of output and productivity were somewhat
slower during the latter boom, the return to more
stable monetary and fiscal policies after the Korean
War may explain why the stock market increased
at a faster pace. The third distinct boom lasted from
June 1962 to January 1966 and coincided with a
long period of economic expansion, characterized
by high average growth of GDP, industrial production,
and productivity, as well as low inflation. 
The stock market performed poorly during the
1970s, with the market peak of January 1973 not
reached again until July 1980. No stock market
booms occurred during this decade of adverse supply
shocks, low productivity growth, highly variable
output growth, and high inflation. The next market
boom occurred during the three-year period from
July 1984 to August 1987. This period of economic
recovery was characterized by moderately strong
real economic growth and falling inflation, but
productivity growth that was below its post-World
War II average. 
The macroeconomic environment of the April
1994–August 2000 boom period is well known.
This period was characterized by somewhat above-
average growth of real output and industrial pro-
duction and low and stable inflation. An increase
in the trend growth rate of productivity to approxi-
mately the rate that had prevailed during the 1950s
and 1960s was the feature of this boom period that
has received the most attention; it has often been
cited as the main fundamental cause of the stock
market boom. 
CONCLUSION
Our survey finds that U.S. stock market booms
have occurred in a variety of macroeconomic envi-
ronments. Nevertheless, some common patterns
are evident:
1. Most booms occurred during periods of rela-
tively rapid economic growth and, to the extent
it can be measured, increases in productivity
growth. This suggests that booms were driven
at least to some extent by fundamentals.
2. Many booms also occurred during periods of
relatively rapid growth of the money stock
and bank credit, reflecting either passive
accommodation of booms by the banking
system or expansion of the monetary base
by means of gold inflows or monetary policy
actions.
3. Stock market booms have occurred in periods
of deflation (e.g., the late 1870s and early
1880s), in periods of inflation (e.g., the 1830s,
1840s, late 1890s, and early 1900s) and in
periods of price stability (e.g., the 1920s and
1990s). In general, booms appear to have been
driven by increases in the growth of real out-
put and productivity and can persist despite
either inflation or deflation so long as the
growth of output and productivity remains
strong.24 The tendency for the money stock,
but not the price level, to grow rapidly during
booms suggests that money growth accom-
modated increases in productivity, which
fueled booms. In the absence of an increase
in money growth, the quantity theory predicts
that an increase in productivity and potential
output growth would lead to deflation. In
future work, we intend to examine formally
whether accelerations in money stock growth
during booms were quantitatively consis-
tent with increases in long-run productivity
growth. 
4. Wartime experience seems to have been 
different from peacetime, but no consistent
24 Periods of depressed stock market returns occurred during periods
of declining productivity growth or other adverse supply shocks. Some
such periods were characterized by deflation (e.g., 1929-32), while
others were characterized by inflation (e.g., the 1970s). In deflationary
periods when aggregate supply growth outpaced aggregate demand,
such as in the late 1870s and early 1880s, the market did as well as it
did in the inflationary 1830s, 1840s, late 1890s, and early 1900s, when
rapid aggregate supply growth was surpassed by demand growth
(Bordo, Lane, and Redish, 2004; Bordo and Redish, 2004). This contrasts
sharply with the experiences of the Great Depression, when collapsing
aggregate demand coincided with a decline in aggregate supply, and
the Stagflation of the 1970s, which was characterized by excessive
growth of aggregate demand in the face of low or negative aggregate
supply growth.
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wartime pattern emerges. The old adage that
“war is good for the market” does not seem to
always hold up. Stock market booms occurred
during World War II and to a lesser extent
the Civil War, but market performance was
relatively poor during World War I and the
Vietnam War.
The stock market booms of 1923-29 and 1994-
2000 stand alone in terms of their length and the
extent to which market averages increased. Both
bull markets have been attributed to increased pro-
ductivity growth associated with the widespread
application of new general-purpose technologies
that promised new eras of rapid economic growth.
The macroeconomic environments in which these
two booms occurred were strikingly similar. Both
decades saw above-average, though not exceptional,
growth of real output and industrial production,
while consumer price inflation was quite low and
stable. Productivity growth did increase in both the
1920s and 1990s; though, in the 1920s, productivity
growth appears to have occurred prior to the stock
market boom, whereas the increase in productivity
growth during the 1990s coincided with the boom. 
Policymakers paid a great deal of attention to
the stock market during each of the great booms.
In the 1920s, debate centered on whether the Fed
had fostered the boom by oversupplying Federal
Reserve credit through open market purchases and
inadequate administration of the discount window.
Many Fed officials adhered to the Real Bills Doctrine,
which held that an increase in credit beyond that
required to finance short-term production and dis-
tribution of real goods would end up fostering
speculation and inflation. Despite the absence of
consumer price inflation, officials interpreted the
stock market boom as evidence of inflation. Accord-
ingly, the Fed tightened policy in 1928 and 1929,
which may have hastened the collapse of both stock
prices and the economy (Schwartz, 1981; Hamilton,
1987). Lingering doubts about the efficacy of using
monetary policy to foster economic recovery then
contributed to the Fed’s failure to ease aggressively
to fight the Great Depression (Wheelock, 1991;
Meltzer, 2002).
The Fed’s understanding of the role of monetary
policy was quite different in the 1990s and 2000s.
Transcripts of FOMC meetings indicate that, during
the 1990s, the Fed was mainly concerned about
the potential consequences of a sharp decline in
stock prices, fearing that falling stock prices would
reduce consumption by reducing wealth. Although
the Fed did tighten policy in the later stages of the
boom by raising its target for the federal funds rate
in 1999-2000, it eased aggressively when stock prices
declined and the economy entered recession. In
sharp contrast to its policy in the early 1930s, the
Fed maintained an aggressively accommodative
monetary policy well after the stock market decline
had ended, with the objectives of preventing defla-
tion and encouraging economic recovery. 
Our survey of U.S. stock market booms finds
that booms do not occur in the absence of increases
in real economic growth and perhaps productivity
growth. We find little indication that booms were
caused by excessive growth of money or credit,
though 19th century booms tended to occur during
periods of monetary expansion. The view that mon-
etary authorities can cause asset market speculation
by failing to control the use of credit has been largely
discarded. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests
that the stock market sometimes rises more than
can be justified by fundamentals, though economists
continue to debate whether even the market peak
of 1929 was too high. Not surprisingly, these ques-
tions leave unsettled the issue of how monetary
policy should respond to an asset price boom.
Although one can offer plausible theoretical argu-
ments for responding proactively to an asset price
boom, our survey suggests that policymakers should
be cautious about attempting to deflate asset prices
without strong evidence that a collapse of asset
prices would have severe macroeconomic costs. 
REFERENCES
Alchian, Armen A. and Klein, Benjamin. “On a Correct
Measure of Inflation.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
February 1973, 5(1, Part 1), pp. 173-191.
Balke, Nathan S. and Gordon, Robert J. “Appendix B,
Historical Data,” in Robert J. Gordon, ed., The American
Business Cycle: Continuity and Change. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 781-850.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Gertler, Mark. “Should Central Banks
Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?” American
Economic Review, May 2001, 91(2), pp. 253-57. 
Bernanke, Ben S. and Gertler, Mark. “Monetary Policy and
Asset Volatility.” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Economic Review, Fourth Quarter 1999, 84(4), pp. 17-52.
Bordo, Michael D.; Dueker, Michael J. and Wheelock, David C.
 Bordo and Wheelock REVIEW
42 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2004
“Aggregate Price Shocks and Financial Stability: The
United Kingdom, 1796-1999.” Explorations in Economic
History, April 2003, 40(2), pp. 143-69. 
Bordo, Michael D.; Dueker, Michael J. and Wheelock, David C.
“Aggregate Price Shocks and Financial Stability: A
Historical Analysis.” Economic Inquiry, October 2002,
40(4), pp. 521-38.
Bordo, Michael D. and Jeanne, Olivier. “Boom-Busts in
Asset Prices, Economic Instability, and Monetary Policy.”
NBER Working Paper No. 8966, National Bureau of
Economic Research, May 2002a.
Bordo, Michael D. and Jeanne, Olivier. “Monetary Policy
and Asset Prices: Does ‘Benign Neglect’ Make Sense?”
International Finance, 2002b, 5(2), pp. 139-64.
Bordo, Michael D.; Rappoport, Peter and Schwartz, Anna J.
“Money versus Credit Rationing: Evidence for the National
Banking Era, 1880-1914,” in Claudia Goldin and Hugh
Rockhoff, eds., Strategic Factors in Nineteenth Century
American Economic History, A Volume to Honor Robert
W. Fogel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp.
189-224.
Bordo, Michael D.; Lane, John Landon and Redish, Angela.
“Good Versus Bad Deflation: Lessons from the Gold
Standard Era.” NBER Working Paper No. 10329, National
Bureau of Economic Research, February 2004.
Bordo, Michael D. and Redish, Angela. “Is Deflation
Depressing? Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard,”
in Richard C.K. Burdekin and Pierre L. Siklos, eds.,
Deflation: Current and Historical Perspectives. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Borio, Claudio; English, William and Filardo, Andrew. “A Tale
of Two Perspectives: Old or New Challenges for Monetary
Policy?” Working Paper No. 127, Bank for International
Settlements, February 2003.
Borio, Claudio and Lowe, Philip. “Asset Prices, Financial
and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus.” Working
Paper No. 114, Bank for International Settlements, July
2002.
Borio, Claudio and White, William. “Whither Monetary
and Financial Stability? The Implications of Evolving
Policy Regimes.” Presented at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City Symposium on Monetary Policy and
Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy, Jackson
Hole, Wyoming, August 2003.
Brunner, Karl and Meltzer, Allan H. “Mr. Hicks and the
‘Monetarists’.” Economica, February 1973, 40(157), pp.
44-59.
Bryan, Michael F.; Cecchetti, Stephen G. and O’Sullivan,
Roisin. “Asset Prices in the Measurement of Inflation.”
NBER Working Paper No. 8700, National Bureau of
Economic Research, January 2002.
Bullard, James B. and Schaling, Eric. “Why the Fed Should
Ignore the Stock Market.” Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Review, March/April 2002, 84(2), pp. 35-42.
Cecchetti, Stephen G. “What the FOMC Says and Does
When the Stock Market Booms.” Prepared for the Reserve
Bank of Australia conference on Asset Prices and Monetary
Policy, Sydney, Australia, August 2003.
Cecchetti, Stephen G.; Genberg, Hans; Lipsky, John and
Wadhwani, Sushil. Asset Prices and Central Bank Policy.
Geneva Reports on the World Economy. Volume 2. Geneva:
International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies;
London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, July 2000.
Chandler, Lester V. American Monetary Policy 1928-1941.
New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Cole, Arthur H. Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United
States, 1700-1861. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1938.
Cowles, Alfred III and Associates. Common Stock Indexes.
Cowles Commission for Research Economics Monograph
No. 3. Second Ed. Bloomington, IN: Principia Press, 1939.
David, Paul A. “The Dynamo and the Computer: An
Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity
Paradox.” American Economic Review, May 1990, 80(2),
pp. 355-61.
David, Paul A. and Solar, Peter. “A Bicentenary Contribution
to the History of the Cost of Living in America.” Research
in Economic History, 1977, 2, pp. 1-80.
David, Paul A. and Wright, Gavin. “General Purpose
Technologies and Surges in Productivity: Historical
Reflections on the Future of the ICT Revolution.”
Presented at the International Symposium on Economic
Challenges of the 21st Century in Historical Perspective,
Oxford, July 1999.
 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Bordo and Wheelock
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2004      43
Davis, Joseph H. “An Annual Index of U.S. Industrial
Production, 1790-1915.” Working paper, Department of
Economics, Duke University, October 2002.
Detken, Carsten and Smets, Frank. “Asset Price Booms and
Monetary Policy.” Presented at the Kiel Institute of World
Economics conference on Macroeconomic Policies in the
World Economy, June 2003 (revised, December 2003).
Eichengreen, Barry and Mitchener, Kris. “The Great
Depression as a Credit Boom Gone Wrong.” Working
paper, Department of Economics, University of California-
Berkeley, March 2003.
Fels, Rendig. American Business Cycles, 1865-1897. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959.
Field, Alexander J. “The Most Technologically Progressive
Decade of the Century.” American Economic Review,
September 2003, 93(4), pp. 1399-413.
Filardo, Andrew J. “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices.”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review,
Third Quarter 2000, 85(3), pp. 11-37.
Fisher, Irving. The Stock Market Crash—And After. New York:
Macmillan, 1930.
Friedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna J. Monetary Statistics
of the United States: Estimates, Sources, and Methods.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.
Friedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna J. A Monetary History
of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1963a.
Friedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna J. “Money and
Business Cycles.” Review of Economics and Statistics,
February 1963b, 45(1 Suppl, Part 2), pp. 32-64.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Great Crash, 1929. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1961.
Goldin, Claudia Dale and Lewis, Frank G. “The Economic
Cost of the American Civil War: Estimates and
Implications.” Journal of Economic History, June 1975,
35(2), pp. 299-326.
Goodhart, Charles A. and Hofmann, Boris. “Do Asset Prices
Help Predict Consumer Price Inflation?” Manchester
School, 2000, 68(Suppl), pp. 122-40.
Gordon, Robert J. “Does the ‘New Economy’ Measure Up to
the Great Inventions of the Past?” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Fall 2000a, 14(4), pp. 49-74.
Gordon, Robert J. Macroeconomics. Eighth Edition. Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley, 2000b.
Greenspan, Alan. “Technology Innovation and its Economic
Impact.” Remarks before the National Technology Forum,
St. Louis, Missouri, April 7, 2000.
Hamilton, James D. “Monetary Factors in the Great
Depression,” Journal of Monetary Economics, March 1987,
19(2), pp. 145-69.
Hayford, Marc D. and Malliaris, A.G. “Monetary Policy and
the U.S. Stock Market,” Economic Inquiry, July 2004,
42(3), pp. 387-401.
Helbling, Thomas and Terrones, Marco. “Asset Price Booms
and Busts—Stylized Facts from the Last Three Decades
of the 20th Century.” Working paper, International
Monetary Fund, March 2004.
Hoover, Herbert C. The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The
Great Depression, 1929-1941. New York: Macmillan, 1952.
Jovanovic, Boyan and Rousseau, Peter L. “Measuring
General Purpose Technologies.” Presented at the Duke
University and University of North Carolina conference
on Understanding the 1990s: The Economy in Long-Run
Perspective, Durham, North Carolina, March 26-27, 2004.
Kendrick, John W. Productivity Trends in the United States.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
Laidler, David. “The Price Level, Relative Prices, and
Economic Stability: Aspects of the Interwar Debate.”
Prepared for the Bank for International Settlements con-
ference on Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the
Business Cycle, Basel, Switzerland, 2003.
Macaulay, Frederick R. Some Theoretical Problems Suggested
by the Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields, and Stock
Prices in the United States Since 1856. New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1938.
McCandless, George T. Jr. “Money, Expectations, and the
U.S. Civil War.” American Economic Review, June 1996,
86(3), pp. 661-71.
McGrattan, Ellen R. and Prescott, Edward C. “The 1929
Stock Market: Irving Fisher Was Right.” Staff Report 294,
 Bordo and Wheelock REVIEW
44 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2004
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research
Department, May 2003.
Meltzer, Allan H. A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 1:
1913-1951. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
Metzler, Lloyd A. “Wealth, Saving, and the Rate of Interest.”
Journal of Political Economy, April 1951, 59(2), pp. 93-116.
Miron, Jeffrey A. and Romer, Christina D. “A New Monthly
Index of Industrial Production, 1884-1940.” NBER
Working Paper No. 3172, National Bureau of Economic
Research, November 1989.
Mishkin, Frederic S. and White, Eugene N. “U.S. Stock
Market Crashes and Their Aftermath: Implications for
Monetary Policy.” Prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago and World Bank conference on Asset Bubbles,
Chicago, April 23, 2002.
Pagan, Adrian R. and Sossounov, Kirill A. “A Simple Frame-
work for Analysing Bull and Bear Markets.” Journal of
Applied Econometrics, January/February 2003, 18(1), pp.
23-46.
Rappoport, Peter and White, Eugene N. “Was the Crash of
1929 Expected?” American Economic Review, March 1994,
84(1), pp. 271-81.
Rigobon, R. and Sack, Brian. “Measuring the Reaction of
Monetary Policy to the Stock Market.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, May 2003, 118(2), pp. 639-69.
Rothbard, Murray. America’s Great Depression. Fourth
Edition. New York: Richardson and Snyder, 1983.
Rousseau, Peter L. “Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie
Flows, and the Panic of 1837.” Journal of Economic
History, June 2002, 62(2), pp. 457-88.
Schinasi, Garry and Hargraves, Monica. “Boom and Bust”
in Asset Markets in the 1980s: Causes and Consequences.
Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook. Washington,
DC: International Monetary Fund, 1993.
Schwartz, Anna J. “Asset Price Inflation and Monetary
Policy.” NBER Working Paper No. 9321, National Bureau
of Economic Research, November 2002.
Schwartz, Anna J. “Why Financial Stability Depends on
Price Stability.” Economic Affairs, Autumn 1995, 15(4),
pp. 21-25.
Schwartz, Anna J. “Understanding 1929-1933,” in Karl
Brunner, ed., The Great Depression Revisited. Boston:
Martinus-Nihoff, 1981, pp. 5-48.
Schwert, G. William. “Indexes of U.S. Stock Prices from
1802 to 1987.” Journal of Business, July 1990, 63(3), pp.
399-426.
Smets, Frank. “Financial Asset Prices and Monetary Policy:
Theory and Evidence.” Working Paper No. 47, Bank for
International Settlements, September 1997.
Smith, Walter B. and Cole, Arthur H. Fluctuations in
American Business, 1790-1860. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1935.
Temin, Peter. The Jacksonian Economy. New York: Norton,
1969.
Tobin, James. “A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary
Theory.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, February
1969, 1(1), pp. 15-29.
Wheelock, David C. The Strategy and Consistency of Federal
Reserve Monetary Policy, 1924-1933. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1991.
White, Eugene N. “Bubbles and Busts: The 1990s in the
Mirror of the 1920s.” Paper presented at Duke University
and the University of North Carolina conference,
Understanding the 1990s: The Long-Run Perspective,
Durham, North Carolina, March 26-27, 2004.
Woodford, Michael. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a
Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2003.
 